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Accounting Regulation and Management Discretion – A Case 
Note 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the manipulation of published financial reports in order to 
counter the potentially unfavourable impact of newly introduced regulation.  In this 
case the reported capital ratio of a major British building society was enhanced using 
a sale and leaseback transaction with a related party and a change in depreciation 
policy, methods which reflected limited alternatives.  Analysis of the case is set in the 
context of the sector and addresses the questions of whether these manipulations were 
within then-prevailing generally accepted accounting principles and why, despite 
disclosure in the society’s financial statements, they failed to attract public comment 
or concern, regulatory action or an audit qualification. In examining a major British 
mutual financial organisation we depart from traditional analyses of managerial 
discretion in accounting choices in British companies.  
Key words: Accounting manipulation; Creative accounting; Sale and leaseback; 
Depreciation; Building societies; United Kingdom. 
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 This article investigates the response of a U.K. financial institution when regulatory 
change threatened to curtail its growth opportunities. The evolving inter-relationships 
between strategic decision-making, regulation and accounting practices are central to 
our analysis of this case.  The key explanation of how and why those practices 
emerged in their historical context is managerial concern about the effects of changed 
regulatory requirements on stakeholder evaluation of the entity’s performance. 
Building societies are mutual organizations, owned by their members who are 
their customers – borrowers and those depositors with ownership rights, described as 
‘shareholders’. There were 819 societies in 1950, although 10 per cent of these 
accounted for about 50 per cent of the total assets of the ‘movement’ (i.e. the building 
society sector).   Among the large societies, a handful had transformed themselves 
from the typical small and local organizations into large national ones.  This article 
focuses on one such society, the Co-operative Permanent Building Society (hereafter 
the CPBS or the Society), whose rapid growth was both organic and driven by 
amalgamations with other societies.  By the end of the 1950s this growth had left the 
CPBS with a strategic problem: a weakened capital position when explicit statutory 
capital and liquidity requirements were first imposed on societies, which had finally 
won a long-running argument that trustees should be allowed to hold building society 
deposits. 
The article addresses the question of how the CPBS, from an unpromising 
position, secured compliance with this new regulation when failure to meet the new 
capital requirements might have threatened the Society’s status.  Our discussion has 
two aspects: the ‘creative accounting’ solutions used and the acquiescence of various 
stakeholder groups in their use. The CPBS entered into transactions which appeared to 
comply with the relevant regulation and prevailing generally accepted accounting 
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principles (GAAP), but had a material positive impact on the Society’s reported 
financial position.  The aggregate effect of these changes was clearly disclosed in the 
financial statements but failed to attract public comment from the auditors, the 
regulator, other societies or the press. 
This article constitutes a compelling story for several reasons. First, we focus on 
one large institution, providing a rich account of the business strategy and operations 
typical of a large society.  Little has been written about the business and accounting 
history of individual building societies, although the twentieth century history and 
performance of the building society movement in transforming retail deposits and 
‘share’ investments into long-term mortgage financing for domestic house purchases 
has been well-documented (see, e.g., Davies, 1981; Boléat, 1986; McKillop and 
Ferguson, 1993; Jeremy, 1998; Bátiz-Lazo, 2004).   
Second, this article examines an otherwise neglected area in the history of 
financial reporting, providing a detailed case study of creative accounting in an 
industry and period not especially known for manipulative activity, and in an 
organization which survived and was not subject to investigation.  Stolowy and 
Breton (2004, p. 6) describe creative accounting as a journalistic term that represents 
the exercise of management’s discretion to make accounting choices or design 
transactions so as to modify apparent performance and enable transfers between the 
company and society (political costs), fund providers (cost of capital) or managers 
(compensation plans). The potential impact of these transactions will depend on the 
market context (Stolowy and Breton, 2004, p. 10). Much of the extant work on 
creative accounting in Britain focuses on manufacturing, transport and mining 
companies and generally examines time periods before the ‘watershed’ Companies 
Act 1948 (CA48) (e.g., Napier, 1990, 1991; Arnold, 1991).  Such studies pay close 
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attention to the links between improved disclosure, fixed asset accounting, inner or 
secret reserve accounting and ‘profit smoothing’, and help to legitimize the rationale 
for the major changes in financial reporting requirements in CA48 (Arnold, 1997; 
Maltby, 2000). Arnold and Matthews (2002) and Arnold and Collier (2007) have 
demonstrated the effect of CA48 on corporate financial reporting.
1
  Banks, together 
with certain other types of company, enjoyed significant exemptions from this Act, 
with considerable impact on their financial reporting (Billings and Capie, 2009).  But 
building societies, outside the scope of CA48 as mutual organizations, have not been 
subject to similar examination and had less opportunity to hold ‘hidden reserves’.  
Indeed, the CPBS case is unusual in that the accounting manipulations were clearly 
reflected in the Society’s published financial statements, but failed to arouse public 
interest. 
Third, this article responds to the call by Stolowy and Breton (2004, p. 29) for 
more research on the motivations for manipulating accounts.  We argue that the 
motivation in this instance was the desire to avoid an adverse regulatory outcome.  
The case can therefore also be placed in the context of the so-called ‘bond covenant 
hypothesis’ (Clinch, 1983, p. 141), whereby managers will wish to avoid the costs of 
violating restrictions, in this instance, the possible loss of a particular regulatory 
status. 
 
THE CHANGING REGULATION OF BUILDING SOCIETIES 
 
In this section we explain the financial reporting and regulatory requirements for 
building societies.  The Building Societies Act 1894 (BSA94) gave powers to the 
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Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies (CRFS) to intervene in the affairs of societies 
and required full accounting disclosure and professional audits (Phillips, 1983, p. 4). 
Although subsequently amended, notably in the Building Societies Act 1940, BSA94 
remained the main statute regulating U.K. societies until changes introduced in 1959 
and 1960. 
The Housing and House Purchase Act 1959 
Following the enactment of the Housing and House Purchase Act 1959 
(HHPA59), societies gained two forms of government recognition: ‘their deposits 
became authorized trustee investments and building societies became entitled, for the 
first time in their long history, to borrow from H. M. Government’.2  A 1954 
voluntary agreement had channelled £100 million from government through the 
societies to promote home ownership, but disadvantaged borrowers who wanted to 
buy a house built before 1919 (Registry of Friendly Societies (RFS), 1961, pp. 13-14; 
RFS, 1962, p. 357; Cleary, 1965; Boddy, 1980, pp. 17-19; Boléat, 1981, p. 153).
3
   To 
continue to ‘help people with moderate incomes … to fulfil their ambition of 
becoming home-owners’,4 the government proposed making further advances through 
societies, which agreed to take on the business in return for the designation of their 
deposits as suitable for investment by trustees.
5
 
‘Trustee investment status’ was first sought by societies for investments in 
their ‘shares’ and deposits in the mid-1920s (Humphries, 1987, p. 335).  Without it, 
trustees, including executors of estates of the deceased, were unable to invest in 
building societies in the absence of specific directions. Societies believed that this 
status would give them a competitive advantage and increase their loanable resources
6
 
but it rapidly turned into ‘a seal of respectability … and all but a very few societies 
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eligible for have sought and obtained such status’ (Boléat, 1981, p. 32).  Designated 
status had been achieved by 218 of the 732 registered societies in December 1960, 
whose assets of £2,994 million comprised 94 per cent of the total assets of all 
registered societies (RFS, 1961, p. 6). By December 1961 there were 255 designated 
societies, with assets of £3,274 million, 95.3 per cent of the total for all registered 
societies (RFS, 1962, p. 5).  
  Initial qualification for, or revocation of, trustee investment status was at the 
discretion of the CRFS (RFS, 1961, p. 7), with no requirement for automatic 
revocation when a society ceased to fulfil the requirements of the HHPA59.  A later 
Statutory Instrument required that to be granted this status a society should meet a 
minimum net reserve ratio (of 2.5 per cent of net assets at the end of 1960) and a 
minimum liquidity requirement (of 7.5 per cent of total assets at the end of 1960) (S.I. 
1959 No. 1010).  The Building Societies Association (BSA), the voluntary industry 
body, adopted these same requirements as a condition for renewal of membership, but 
did not require compliance until 1965, to allow smaller and less liquid societies time 
to meet them. The BSA’s move was intended to give ‘… the public the same 
guarantee of security in the case of deposits and investments in smaller societies, [as] 
trustee status gave to the larger societies’ (Cleary, 1965, p. 268). 
Meeting the liquidity requirement was straightforward for most societies - for 
the sector as a whole cash and investments had exceeded 14 per cent of total assets for 
every year since 1945 (Cleary, 1965, p. 256) and were to remain above 15 per cent 
until at least 1973 (Greer, 1974, p. 11).  The ‘normal’ range for liquidity ratios for 
individual societies within any one year was between 12 and 22 per cent (Perks, 1977, 
p. 62).  Meeting the reserve requirement, however, was more challenging.  Just as 
capital adequacy sustains confidence in banks, building societies need reserves to 
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provide against various contingencies to maintain investor confidence: losses on the 
sale of mortgaged properties following borrower default; losses on the realization of 
investments in (mainly fixed income) securities; and to guard against the unknown.
7
  
Before the HHPA59, the BSA had long recommended that every society should aim 
for ‘gross’ (i.e. a less strictly defined level of) reserves of at least 5 per cent of total 
assets. In 1938 the average figure for all societies was 5.5 per cent and had fallen to 
4.5 per cent by 1957, but this ‘decline in the [gross] reserve ratio was not in itself 
regarded as serious’ by the BSA.8 The average gross reserve ratio for the major 
societies had dropped from 5.0 per cent in 1950 to 3.8 per cent in 1959 (Table 1, 
Panel A).   
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
In 1959 the CRFS, Sir Cecil Crabbe, noted that some societies had increased 
their general reserves by abandoning the practice of making provisions for future 
liabilities.  He also noted that some societies had revalued their office premises to 
increase general reserves, but such revaluations were disregarded in the assessment 
for designation, unless the society intended to realize the higher value in the 
foreseeable future (RFS, 1960, p. 8). 
The Building Societies Act 1960  
The collapse of the State Building Society in September 1959 hastened 
enhanced disclosure requirements in the Building Societies Act 1960 (BSA60) 
(Noguchi and Bátiz-Lazo, 2010).
9
 These requirements, although expressed in general 
terms, made the BSA60 more prescriptive than the CA48.  But there was still ample 
room for society directors and auditors to interpret whether certain accounting choices 
represented ‘fair presentation’. There was, for instance, no specific guideline on 
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depreciation, but disclosure was required of ‘… the method of arriving at the amount 
at which any office premises were shown in the society’s Annual Return’ (the Form 
A.R. 11).
10
 
In the late nineteenth century, building society fraud had been an important 
factor in the change of the primary audit objective in England from ‘statement 
verification’ to ‘fraud detection’ (Kitchen and Parker, 1980, p. 55; Chandler et al., 
1993, p. 446).  In the late 1920s, and especially the 1930s, opinion shifted to place 
greater emphasis on ‘statement verification’ and this was reflected in the general 
CA48 requirement that the auditors state whether the accounts gave ‘a true and fair 
view’ (Chandler et al., 1993, p. 452).  However, this requirement did not apply to 
building society audits until the BSA60 aligned the treatment of societies with that of 
corporate bodies under the CA48, thus shifting the building society audit objective 
from ‘fraud detection’ to ‘statement verification’.  The BSA60 also introduced the 
duty of building society auditors to report on internal control, preceding by several 
decades similar requirements in, for example, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002.  The BSA60 was a key success for The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW), which had made lengthy representations on behalf of 
its members to secure changes in building society audit requirements (Noguchi and 
Bátiz-Lazo, 2010).  The financial statements of building societies from 1960 onwards 
were thus subject to a different audit regime than those of 1959 and earlier.  
Other Accounting and Auditing Requirements 
Accountants readily accept that accounting principles allow scope for interpretation, 
but ‘[t]o be legal, interpretations may be in keeping with the spirit of the [accounting] 
standard or, at the other extreme, clearly stretch that spirit while remaining within the 
letter of the law’ (Stolowy and Breton, 2004, p. 11).  In the absence of codified 
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GAAP, historians of creative accounting compare and contrast transactions in a 
particular organization with practices in similar organizations in order to determine 
whether a group of transactions should be considered as ‘fair presentation’, 
manipulation or fraud (e.g., Arnold, 1991). 
A number of sources other than legislation could have impacted on the practices 
of building societies. The ICAEW’s Taxation and Financial Relations Committee, 
formed in 1942, issued ‘Recommendations on Accounting Principles’.  The new 
building societies legislation, and its role in it, led the ICAEW to issue its first 
auditing publication, the booklet ‘Audits of Building Societies’ (ICAEW, 1960).  This 
was concerned mainly with the system of internal control and verification of mortgage 
advances.  Guidance on ‘window dressing’ addressed liquidity, not capital, and 
specific guidance on fixed assets and capital was lacking. 
Another non-legislative source was the BSA’s ‘Financial Accounting Procedures’. 
These guidelines explicitly recognized that there were wide differences in accounting 
policies behind the apparent simplicity and uniformity in the financial statements of 
building societies. The ‘Procedures’ considered ‘source[s] of great variability between 
building societies’, such as labour costs within ‘Total Management Expenses’,11 but 
did not address the depreciation of fixed assets. 
  The BSA60’s statutory instruments left largely unaffected the choice of 
accounting policies by individual societies, and the ICAEW’s Recommendations and 
audit guidance, and the BSA’s ‘Financial Accounting Procedures’ offered room for 
interpretation in areas such as the depreciation of fixed assets.  This apparent latitude 
created opportunities for creative accounting at the CPBS.  The next section sets out a 
brief history of the CPBS and discusses the growth in assets of the largest building 
societies to establish the need for creative accounting at the CPBS. 
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THE CO-OPERATIVE PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY 
 
Brief Business History 
The CPBS (today Nationwide) was born as the Southern Co-operative Permanent 
Building Society in February 1884. The ‘Southern’ prefix was removed ten years 
later. This London-based society was formed to enable depositors, particularly 
members of the co-operative movement, to buy their own homes (Ashworth, 1980, p. 
15; Cassell, 1984, p. 13). The Co-operative Congress, however, refused to give full 
backing to another financial institution developing alongside the banking arm of the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society (the CWS Bank - see Bátiz-Lazo, 2004; 2006), but 
many leading and rank and file members of the co-operative movement joined the 
CPBS and some became its agents, either personally or through their retail societies.  
The CPBS also sought business elsewhere, notably amongst railway employees 
(Cassell, 1984, pp.  24-5). 
Mortgage advances of the CPBS and other building societies surged in the 
1920s and accelerated further during the 1930s (Humphries, 1987; Scott and Newton, 
2011). This growth was accompanied by the emergence and increase in the numbers 
of both agency contracts and retail branches.
12
  By 1950 the combination of 
government policy antagonistic to private home ownership, the mortgage rate cartel,
13
 
together with inflation and low savings rates, had led most societies to accumulate 
substantial liquid assets.  The co-operative movement then provided about one-quarter 
of the CPBS’s deposits (Cassell, 1984, p. 86).  Further growth followed the 1951 
return of a Conservative government, more sympathetic to private home ownership. 
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Building society advances grew from 27 per cent of total mortgage 
transactions in 1920 to 38 per cent in 1936, and 50 per cent in 1958 (Cleary, 1965, p. 
282).  Growth among the societies was uneven.  By 1958, the top five societies held 
assets of £1.029 billion, 43 per cent of the total assets for all 755 societies,
14
 and were 
growing at double the rate of all those other societies.  Most of this growth was 
organic, with little due to amalgamations with smaller societies, as the larger societies 
appear to have been more effective at capturing market share in the expanding retail 
mortgage market (Bátiz-Lazo and Billings, 2007).  The largest five societies plus the 
Alliance Building Society maintained annual average growth in mortgage assets of 13 
per cent per year from 1950 to 1967 (Table 2, Panel A), during which time mortgage 
assets averaged 83 per cent of total assets of these societies. 
 [Insert Table 2 around here] 
 Growth in the CPBS’s mortgage assets during the 1950s exceeded the average for 
the top five societies (Cassell, 1984, p. 72; Table 2, Panel B).  It peaked at 24 per cent 
in 1958, when the CPBS amalgamated with the Scottish Amicable Building Society 
(SABS), the largest Scottish society, which had assets of £22.5 million and 42,658 
shareholders (14 per cent and 11 per cent of those of the combined entity 
respectively).  After yields on gilt-edged securities reached 7 per cent in September 
1957, the SABS’s reserves of £997,792 at December 1957 were exceeded by the 
unrealized loss of £1.5 million on its investment holdings.
15
 Deposit withdrawal 
notices followed publication of these figures, and reached £2.5 million by 23 April 
1958, but most were cancelled after the merger was announced.
16
 
Even before this amalgamation, the CPBS had drawn the attention of 
managers of the Woolwich Equitable (WEBS), who appeared to believe that its 
capital position was under pressure and that non-recurring items flattered profits:  
 13 
The General Manager submitted orally to the Board a report on certain 
features of the Annual Report of the Co-operative Permanent Society for 
1957.  Reference was made, inter alia, to the small revenue surplus for the 
year, the low reserve ratio and an increase over the year in the extent of 
appreciation of Stock Exchange Securities shown in the Balance Sheet which 
apparently arose from investment transactions during the year, including the 
taking into the Profit of a capital surplus of £262,170 on investments realised 
during the year.
17 
 WEBS directors returned to this theme a few months later, suggesting that the 
combination of organic growth and absorption of small societies had stretched the 
CPBS when they: 
noted that since 1939 [to 1957, the] transfers of engagements to the Co-
operative Permanent had amounted to £6.1m (including £3.6m of the Exeter 
Benefit [1956]), compared to £294,000 for Halifax and £220,000 for 
Woolwich.  There has been a marked rise in the management expenses ratio of 
the Co-operative Society over the period …18 
Soon after the SABS amalgamation the CPBS was involved in a public 
exchange during its bid for the Sheerness and Gillingham Society, the sector’s first-
ever contested amalgamation.
19
  H.V. Wiles, chairman of the Hastings and Thanet 
Society, the original bidder, questioned publicly whether the CPBS, then the third 
largest society in terms of assets, would achieve trustee investment status.  The CPBS 
responded that it ‘would qualify for trustee status within the set time’.20 W.W. 
Wetherhill, general manager of the Hastings, considered the CPBS’s intervention 
‘unsolicited and unwarranted’, but Herbert Ashworth, CPBS general manager, 
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declared that it ‘was justified by the strong reserve position and the well spread assets 
of the Sheerness society’.21  After the Leek and Moorlands (LMBS) also made an 
offer for the Sheerness, the Hastings raised its offer and won control over the £3 
million in total assets and 8,000 members.
22
 
The Importance of Capital and Trustee Investment Status in Building Societies 
How then did this period of high growth affect societies’ reserve ratios?  From 1959 
to 1967 ‘gross’ reserve ratios averaged 3.8 per cent and ‘net’ reserve ratios (i.e. after 
adjusting for unrealized profits or losses on investments) averaged 3.5 per cent for the 
top five societies and the Alliance (Table 1).  The net reserve ratios for the Alliance 
(2.5 per cent in 1959 and 2.9 per cent in 1960) and the CPBS (2.3 per cent in 1959 
and 2.7 per cent in 1960) stand out as relatively weak (Table 1, Panel B).  Assets of 
these societies had grown particularly rapidly between 1950 and 1958 (Alliance: 128 
per cent and CPBS: 166 per cent - Table 2, Panel B). These two, and the smaller 
LMBS, had enjoyed high rates of asset growth since 1945 (Cleary, 1965, p. 252).  The 
BSA60 was enacted in June 1960 and at the CPBS’s financial year end on 31 
December its reserves ratios remained below those of other large societies (Table 1).  
The CPBS’s directors were closely associated with the virtues of an ‘adequate’ 
level of reserves.  C.J. Dunham, CPBS’s President from 1959 and a BSA Council 
member since 1950, became BSA Chairman in 1961.
23
 Close links between the BSA 
Council and the CPBS dated from the appointment of Arthur Webb, then CPBS’s 
Secretary, to the BSA Executive in 1903. Webb joined the CPBS in 1892 (when total 
assets were £25,000), became managing director in 1928 (when total assets were £7 
million), Chairman in 1939 (when total assets were £30 million) and retired from the 
BSA Executive in 1946 and the CPBS Board in 1951 (when total assets were £66 
million).  Webb ‘constantly urged the desirability of societies maintaining a 10 per 
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cent reserve fund, and whenever he spoke his views merited attention’ (Price, 1959, p. 
381). 
In June 1959 the CPBS was among the first of the societies to be granted 
trustee investment status, which was perceived as a hallmark of prestige as well as 
giving potential for competitive advantage, but depended on maintenance of a 
satisfactory capital position. The Society’s directors would have had a keen desire to 
retain this status, loss of which would have inhibited long-term growth opportunities 
and been regarded as a strong negative signal on the CPBS’s management 
capabilities.
24
   
Other societies also associated themselves with the importance of strong 
reserve ratios.  In the mid-1950s the Halifax, the largest society, experienced internal 
conflict over the issue, which cost it growth to the benefit of other societies, and led to 
that society’s temporary departure from the BSA (Barrow, 2006, pp. 38-49).  The 
Halifax’s conservative attitude to reserves and liquidity was long-standing (Hobson, 
1953, pp. 129-130; Denham, 1958; Barrow, 2006, pp. 23-24).  In early 1959, the 
WEBS considered that a reserve ratio of about 4 per cent would be ‘adequate and 
safe’, and that this could be allowed to fall to 3.5 per cent by 1965.25  Societies such 
as the Bristol and West had traditionally placed a high priority ‘on the maintenance of 
healthy reserve and liquidity ratios, and there was never any question that growth 
would be allowed to diminish either’ (Harvey, 1988, p. 258). 
In his annual report for 1960 the CRFS attempted to raise awareness among 
depositors and the general public of the good business and sound financial standing of 
designated societies, cautioning investors to guard against societies ‘of doubtful 
financial standing, and ... to enquire whether [a society] has been designated as one in 
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which trustees may deposit trust funds’.26  The challenge for the CPBS was clear and 
the following section details its responses. 
 
THE CPBS’S RESPONSE TO THE HOUSING AND HOUSE PURCHASE ACT 
1959 
 
Controlled Growth, 1959-63 
By 1959 the Society’s directors had decided to curb its expansion.  A policy of 
restraint was announced at that year’s Annual General Meeting and reported in the 
Building Societies’ Gazette: ‘In presenting the society’s remarkable figures for 1958 - 
total assets have now reached £204,522,500 - it was emphasised [by Dunham, 
deputising for H.L. Score, the President] that the society’s policy was one of 
controlled expansion’.27  The significance of the new policy was evident to some 
observers: ‘The Co-operative must build up its reserves, for it would not wish to 
jeopardise the prospect of trustee status under the government’s housing bill’.28 
 The period of controlled growth was initially expected to last a couple of years,
29
 
but the need to maintain trustee investment status required that it continue for longer 
than anticipated.  The CPBS relaxed its period of restraint in 1963, when annual 
growth of mortgage assets returned to double-digit rates and the net reserve ratio rose, 
to remain well above 3 per cent.  Several measures had been taken during this period: 
branch network expansion was halted; a £500 ceiling was imposed on new advances, 
at a time when the average mortgage loan in the U.K. was £1,112, virtually the same 
as the CPBS’s own average loan of £1,139 (RFS, 1961, p. 2; CPBS Annual Return, 31 
December 1960); and the flow of new business and commission payments was curbed 
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by terminating the contracts of more than 1,000 agents.  Branch numbers fell a little 
from 119 in 1958, only climbing back to 120 in 1964 (Cassell, 1984, p. 121).  A major 
review of strategy found that half of the 1,159 agencies remaining in 1963 generated 
deposits amounting to less than £2,000. The Society replaced those agents with 
employees and moved to a branch structure wherever possible (Cassell, 1984, pp. 82-
3).
30
  The success of the self-restraint policy was reflected in mortgage asset growth of 
158 per cent between 1958 and 1967 for the CPBS, compared to an average for the 
major societies of 208 per cent (Table 2, Panel B). 
Improving the Reserves Ratio, 1960 
The longer-term success of the controlled growth policy was not assured in 1960 
when the Society’s directors concluded that it might be insufficient to allow the 
reserve requirement to be met.  The result was that the Form A.R. 11 for 1960 showed 
three items which lifted the net reserves ratio: the sale and leaseback of a property 
involving a related party, changes in the basis of depreciation, and the release of a 
taxation provision.  We now describe these three areas in turn and in the next section 
discuss them in greater detail. 
 A ‘Surplus on the sale of premises’ of £424,484 was recorded in a transaction 
with the Co-operative Insurance Society (CIS), whereby the CPBS sold and leased 
back its head office (New Oxford House) and eight retail branch premises, all of 
which ‘stood in the books below their present worth’.31  These freehold properties 
were transferred to the CIS for £500,000 and the CPBS entered into a 99 year 
agreement to lease them back, with the option to repurchase at no more than 10 per 
cent above the sale price.  The freehold of the head office was, indeed, bought back 
after a short interval (Cassell, 1984, p. 80).
32
  The second item was a drop of £71,288 
in the total charge for depreciation recorded in the Revenue and Appropriation 
 18 
Account and the third item was the transfer to the Society’s General Reserve of a 
balance of £255,716 described as an ‘Amount set aside for Future Taxation’.  The 
Society’s Finance Committee: 
had been impressed by the argument that if the whole of the £53,145 required 
by the depreciation formula were provided, it would no longer be possible for 
the society to give an assurance that a net reserve ratio of 2.5 per cent would 
have been attained whether or not New Oxford House had been sold or, 
alternatively, whether or not the basis of provision for income tax had been 
changed. They had therefore reached the conclusion that is was desirable for 
all adjustments already agreed by the Board to be made so that the accounts 
would indicate a net reserve ratio of 2.677 per cent. 
... since the Committee had considered the accounts, the Auditors had decided 
that it would be necessary for a note to appear on the Revenue and 
Appropriation Account if no depreciation were provided on freehold premises 
in 1960. The Board was informed that, if an amount of up to £13,000 were 
provided on freehold premises, the note would not be needed, and it would 
still be possible to give the assurance mentioned above.
33
 
  
 The Minutes of the Board and of the Finance Committee detailed neither the 
depreciation formula nor the calculations supporting the difference between the 
£53,145 required by the formula, the £13,000 charge acceptable to the auditors, and 
the actual charge for depreciation on premises of £24,254 shown in the Form A.R. 11 
for 1960. 
 The combined effect of these three measures was to raise the net reserve ratio 
of the CPBS to 2.7 per cent in 1960 (Table 1, Panel B), above the required minimum 
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of 2.5 per cent. These actions proved timely, as continued growth in mortgage 
advances for the movement as a whole after 1959-60 reduced the reserve ratios of 
many societies, although net reserve ratios of the largest averaged at least 3 per cent in 
the period 1959-67 (Table 1, Panel B).  By 1963 some other societies were near the 
point of having to decide between continued growth and loss of trustee investment 
status or maintenance of this status with slower growth (Cleary, 1965, p. 258), a 
dilemma which the CPBS had already addressed.
34
 
  
DISCUSSION 
 
Creative Accounting at the CPBS 
The definition of ‘creative accounting’ is much debated.  Clarke et al. (2003, pp. 25-
31), for example, stress the inadequacies of contemporary GAAP with particular 
reference to the Australian context, and distinguish ‘feral accounting’ as that which is 
intended to deceive.  Jones (2011, p. 18) defines it as ‘using the flexibility in 
accounting within the regulatory framework to manage the measurement and 
presentation of the accounts so that they give primacy to the interests of the preparers 
not the users’. Accounting literature differentiates between ‘real’ and ‘accruals’ 
aspects of creative accounting i.e. decisions reflecting economic decisions (such as 
cutting discretionary expenditure or changing the timing of particular transactions) 
and accounting decisions (e.g., relating to depreciation or provisioning) (Stolowy and 
Breton, 2004, p. 24).  In the CPBS’s case, the three main elements, with both real and 
accruals aspects, allowed the Society to report an improved capital position. The 
CPBS was able to shift with apparent ease from a position of likely non-compliance 
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with the regulatory requirements to compliance, suggesting that prevailing GAAP 
were sufficiently loose to allow a wide range of accounting outcomes.  An alternative 
interpretation is that the CPBS’s creative accounting was not unusual, but we have 
found no evidence to support this view, and will argue that in the environment in 
which building societies operated there were strong incentives for all parties to accept 
the CPBS’s situation. 
The Property Sale and Leaseback 
This transaction had the most significant immediate impact on the capital ratio, 
generating a £424,000 surplus compared to the £71,000 total reduction in the annual 
depreciation charge, but the latter would have had a significant cumulative impact 
over time.  The counterparty to the transaction, the CIS, was owned jointly by the Co-
operative Wholesale Society and the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, both of 
whom nominated representatives to the CPBS’s board from the mid-1940s to the mid-
1960s (Cassell, 1984, pp. 65 and 86). 
The interpretation of this transaction most favourable to the CPBS is that it 
was able to crystallize a rise in property values without losing control of the properties 
concerned, given that the CRFS had already made known that a straightforward 
revaluation would have been unacceptable, as noted above.  This might be considered 
reasonable had the transaction been undertaken on ‘arms-length’ terms i.e. the price 
paid by the CIS was that which an independent buyer would have paid and the 
leaseback rentals were at a market level.  Unfortunately, the available evidence does 
not allow us to say whether this was the case. A less favourable interpretation is that 
the transaction simply represented ‘warehousing’ of these assets with a related party  
until the CPBS was in a position to exercise the buy-back option.  However 
interpreted, this was an unusual transaction - we have not found evidence of any 
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comparable transaction among the larger societies, but, unlike the CPBS, they did not 
need such a transaction.  The CPBS was also unusual in that its roots in the co-
operative movement provided a natural counterparty. 
Fixed Asset Reporting and Depreciation 
It is not possible to judge what an appropriate depreciation charge for the 
CPBS would have been - to do so would require detail of the composition and 
condition of fixed assets, for example the balance between freehold and leasehold 
properties and the maintenance or obsolescence of equipment.  We examined the 
Forms A.R. 11 for the big six societies and the LMBS for the ten years to 1960.  
Analyses of fixed asset totals and depreciation charges are either not provided at all in 
the Forms A.R. 11, or, if provided, on bases which are not obviously comparable 
across the different societies, but it is possible to make some comparisons over time 
and across societies.  Table 3 shows the societies’ effective depreciation rates and 
reveals considerable variations from society to society, and from year to year for some 
societies.  The Halifax depreciation charges were round sum figures, typically 
£50,000 per year.  The Leeds Permanent charged no depreciation, but in the years 
1958-60 recorded significant expenses for ‘re-equipping and renovating head office 
and branches’ and in the years 1959 and 1960 expensed motor vehicles - we treat 
these items as ‘depreciation’ in the table.  In keeping with its cautious attitudes, the 
Halifax’s depreciation policy appears relatively conservative. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
These findings imply that there was little consensus on depreciation among 
large societies.  The CPBS’s changed treatment of depreciation, although material in 
its overall impact on the financial statements, was arguably not out of line with the 
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practice of other societies, and indeed more conservative than some.  The CPBS’s 
depreciation charge in 1959 appears to have been relatively high by comparison to 
other major societies and also its own recent standards, so the reduced charge in 1960 
could be argued to have aligned it more closely with other societies. 
In deciding the charge for depreciation the CPBS’s directors were also acting 
upon the advice of the auditors, and the Board Minutes of 19 January 1961 
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  suggest 
that the auditors had discussed fully the question of depreciation.  Auditors and 
directors could therefore claim that the working lives of the buildings had been 
properly assessed and that ‘… correct principles had been acted upon, and that the 
provision made in the accounts appears to be reasonable and sufficient’ (de Paula, 
1957, p. 99).  The depreciation decision could also have been defended on the grounds 
of materiality in the overall context of the financial statements - with reserves of 
£6,418,160 and ‘Office Premises and Equipment’ of £3,683,959 in 1959, the 
difference between the £13,000 charged and the £53,145 required by the depreciation 
formula could be regarded as immaterial.  The concept of materiality, although 
explicitly recognized by auditors in the 1950s, remained ill-defined - it did not feature 
in auditing textbooks until the 1970s (Matthews, 2006, pp. 125-6), and the ICAEW’s 
guidance on building society audits (ICAEW, 1960) and its Recommendations on 
Accounting Principles offered no assistance.  But if one were to adopt a substantive 
criterion of materiality, such as the impact on the reserves ratio, then the depreciation 
change would have been judged material. 
Directors and auditors could argue that they followed ‘best practice’ in 1960 
(as described by de Paula, 1957, pp. 98 and 145), as depreciation was charged on 
freehold properties, albeit a lower amount than previously.  Faced with the 
impossibility of estimating the working life of fixed assets that were actively 
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maintained, and largely ignoring the ICAEW’s Recommendations IX and VX, the 
joint-stock clearing banks, with their much larger high street branch networks, chose 
not to depreciate freehold property at all (Capie and Billings, 2001, p. 238). Perks 
(1977, pp. 177-81) claims the situation was similar at building societies in the early 
1970s.  Pack (1959) argued that, as building societies were subject ‘to the burden of a 
true and fair view’ (p. 864), they should revalue office premises annually.  But the 
CRFS was unwilling to accept revaluations of premises and it was not established 
practice among financial institutions - the first revaluation among the major banks did 
not occur until 1964 (Capie and Billings, 2001, p. 248). 
Overall, we conclude that, in exercising discretion in changing depreciation 
policy, the CPBS changed an aspect of its financial statements in which: a) ‘best 
practice’ was not well-established; b) disclosures were variable; c) the Society had 
appeared previously to make greater provision than some other large societies; and d) 
it would be difficult for the auditors to form a judgement as to the appropriateness of 
the charge made. 
Taxation 
The uncertainties associated with taxation have contributed to creative 
accounting in other organisations (see e.g., Arnold, 1991, and Napier, 1990).  The tax 
reserve ‘Amount set aside for Future Taxation’ was identified as a pre-printed caption 
on the Form A.R. 11 only in the years 1959 and 1960 and appears to relate to changes 
in the basis of Income Tax in 1958.  Other specific taxation provisions shown in the 
Form were for Income Tax and Profits Tax. We examined the other societies’ 
balances on this reserve at the end of 1959 and 1960.  For four of these (Alliance, 
Abbey, LMBS, WEBS), the balance was nil in both years.  Halifax had year-end 
balances of £770,000 and nil in 1959 and 1960 respectively and Leeds Permanent 
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£763,000 and £892,500 in these two years.  Although the CPBS’s capital ratio 
benefited from release of this reserve, its elimination was not obviously out of line 
with the treatment of other major societies. 
Creative Accounting in Other Societies 
We do not claim that the CPBS was alone in its practice of creative 
accounting, although our examination of the Forms A.R. 11 of the major societies 
revealed no apparently obvious examples.  But some transactions relating to 
investments could be considered to represent what we now term ‘earnings 
management’.  Some societies recorded significant realized profits on investments and 
write-downs of investment values in various years.  The timing of investment 
disposals could represent ‘real’ earnings management, as a form of ‘gains trading’, 
and the write-downs ‘accruals’ earnings management, with both classes of transaction 
at the discretion of management. 
Acceptance of the CPBS’s Creative Accounting 
In the case of the CPBS creative accounting achieved its objective - the 
desired regulatory status was maintained.  There was clear intent to use specific 
changes in accounting practice or particular transactions to ensure compliance with 
the capital requirements, but the question remains why this failed to attract public 
attention or criticism. 
We have noted that the CPBS’s financial weakness had been recognized by at 
least one other major society, but none of these societies made public comment on the 
CPBS’s difficulties, although the Hastings society had criticized the CPBS during the 
battle for the Sheerness.  Given the nature of the movement it is unlikely that other 
major societies would have believed they could have gained from publicly 
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discrediting the CPBS.  The societies had struggled to secure the prize of trustee 
investment status.  The failure of one of the largest societies to meet the requirements 
for this would have been damaging for the movement as a whole and arguably would 
have discredited the new regulation.  From a commercial point of view, other societies 
may have judged it better to have a weak competitor, which, indeed, conceded growth 
to them during its period of controlled expansion, rather than to shake confidence in 
the movement. 
The movement has a long-standing tradition, revived in recent years, of the 
rescue of societies suffering from financial weakness or scandal by merger with larger 
societies.  During the 1950s the CPBS had ‘rescued’ two societies, the substantial 
SABS, seventeenth largest society (Building Societies Yearbook 1957), and the much 
smaller Exeter Benefit (with assets of £3.4 million versus the CPBS’s £123.4 million 
at the end of 1955).  But at the end of 1960 the CPBS was the third largest society, 
and there would have been considerable obstacles to its merger with another large 
society - its financial position, the co-operative movement links and issues such as the 
overlap of branch networks and dealing with the large number of agents.  To have 
drawn attention to the problems of a society ‘too big to fail’ might have created real 
difficulties for the movement. 
In the absence of documentary evidence we are obliged to speculate as to why 
the CPBS’s creative accounting did not attract the attention of the regulator 
responsible for the protection of shareholders and other depositors.  It is possible that 
the measures taken by the CPBS were accepted by the CRFS as a ‘quid pro quo’ for 
the CPBS’s rescues of the SABS and the Exeter.  There would also have been 
embarrassment for the CRFS in criticising the CPBS, or even withdrawing its trustee 
investment status so soon after it was granted.  An extreme outcome could have been 
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a ‘run’ on the Society, which would not have benefited the regulator or other 
societies, and undermined the new regulatory regime and discredited the movement.  
This could have led to disruption of the provision of mortgage finance and the 
housing market, and possible damage to the co-operative movement.  The CRFS may 
therefore have hoped for the outcome that transpired - that the procedures adopted by 
the CPBS would allow it to ‘buy time’, and coupled with the slowdown in its asset 
growth, the Society was able to improve its reserves ratio. 
Possible Audit Report Qualification and the Auditors’ Relationship with the CPBS 
Another question arises:  should the auditors’ report on CPBS have been 
qualified?  The BSA60 required auditors of building societies to state, by way of a 
note to the Revenue and Appropriation Account or a letter to the CRFS, any items 
affected in every material respect by either (a) transactions of an exceptional or non-
recurrent nature; or (b) by any change in the basis of accounting.
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 Financial reports 
(i.e. Forms A.R. 11) of the top five building societies in the period 1951 to 1970 were 
often accompanied by notes or letters regarding extraordinary matters, but none 
criticised or otherwise disagreed with the directors of these societies.
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  We have 
already noted the wide variations in the practices of asset depreciation in financial 
institutions, and it is debatable whether auditors of building societies might have been 
expected to draw attention to changes in depreciation formulae. 
In this period: ‘Societies were audited by local accountants with whom they 
had connections and a relationship of trust’.38  The Society’s auditors were both 
partners in the firm Edward Myers, Clark & Co., which continued to provide its 
auditors until after 1970.
39
  By 1960 the auditors had known the Society for some 
years and would have been aware of the integrity of the Board and of the long-term 
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steps already taken to reduce growth to allow capital reserves to build up to ensure 
compliance with the minimum net reserve requirement.   
Audit fees were not separately disclosed in the Annual Returns, so it is not 
possible to comment on fee dependency, but later evidence suggests that audit fees 
were a very small proportion of total management expenses (Perks, 1977, pp. 111-
112). Nor do we have any evidence as to whether the auditors undertook other types 
of business for the CPBS which may have exposed them to conflicts of interest.
40
    
It is unclear whether qualifications resulting from doubtful depreciation 
practices were widespread or whether such qualifications would have been regarded 
as serious.  Kettle (1954b, p. 277) cites an auditor’s report describing improper 
depreciation of fixed assets as an exemplar of the consequences of obscure 
qualifications and empirical evidence has shown mixed results depending on the 
nature of the qualification and whether or not it was anticipated (Ball et al., 1979, p. 
27; Clinch, 1983, p. 143; Craswell, 1986, p. 32). Inconsistencies in the requirements 
of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule Nine of the CA48 were identified as sources of 
difficulty in distinguishing auditors’ comments (i.e. amplifications) from outright 
qualifications (Kettle, 1954a, p. 250). 
 Auditor performance must be interpreted in its historical context and this case 
arose in a period before the development of comprehensive auditing guidelines and 
standards.  The CPBS’s auditors were in a difficult position and would have had to 
rely heavily on their judgement in forming their opinion.  There was a new audit 
regime, the concept of materiality was ill-defined, the ICAEW’s guidance on building 
society audits did not address the aspects at issue, and the ICAEW’s 
Recommendations on Accounting Principles and the BSA’s guidelines were not 
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binding and had failed to produce uniformity among societies or other financial 
institutions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has taken an historical perspective to analyse managerial discretion in 
financial services organizations in the context of a changing regulatory environment 
by combining secondary sources with original archival material.  The case of the 
CPBS highlights problems in accounting for fixed assets, materiality and, more 
generally, the nature of the audience for financial statements and to whom auditors are 
accountable. The case offers unusual insight into accounting practice where there was 
a material effect on the reported position of a financial institution, where accounting 
for fixed assets had been a minor consideration. 
This article is not a comprehensive study of financial reporting practices 
among building societies, but the CPBS case does not appear to be representative of 
creative accounting amongst other large building societies.  But there is perhaps some 
irony that a mutual building society should have used techniques of accounting 
manipulation given the apparent nostalgia with which such institutions have been 
viewed since the beginning of the financial crisis of the late 2000s.  However, we 
have shown how, as in other sectors, financial reporting interacts with the external 
environment.  We have extended the creative accounting literature by demonstrating 
that practice varied in important areas of financial reporting in the relatively neglected 
mutual sector, outside the CA48 reporting framework, and that this provided 
opportunities for creative accounting.  There is a notable difference in the form of 
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creative accounting in this case.  Unlike British cases generally before CA48, and 
until at least 1970 in banking, the CPBS case was relatively transparent and involved 
no use of hidden reserves. 
The motivations for accounting manipulation in this case do not fall wholly 
conveniently within usual classifications.  Adopting Stolowy and Breton’s framework, 
the target of manipulation was a regulatory ratio to prevent a loss of status which, in 
the absence of equity shareholders, could have damaged the CPBS, its members, and 
the movement as a whole.  The sale and leaseback related party transaction and 
depreciation changes appear to have been designed to overcome the inability to use 
revaluation to improve the regulatory ratio.  These fall into Stolowy and Breton’s 
category of ‘specially-designed transactions’ (2004, p. 12), as well as the practices 
discussed by  Clarke et al. (2003, p. 31).  Another perspective is to place the case in 
the context of Clinch’s ‘bond covenant hypothesis’ (1983, p. 141). This view suggests 
that covenants will affect management choice of accounting methods since managers 
will seek to avoid the costs of violating restrictions. Such costs may relate to the 
renegotiation of a debt contract, possible bankruptcy arising from technical default, 
or, in this instance, the costs which would likely have arisen from the loss of a 
particular regulatory status, that of being eligible for investments by trustees.  
The case also highlights difficulties in interpreting problems in a service 
business. If a firm in a sector such as manufacturing, transport or mining faced a 
situation of excessive growth, management’s shortcomings would become evident as 
either inventory would grow, plant would remain idle, fixed assets would be poorly 
maintained or replaced at the wrong time and the audit fee would increase 
substantially. In a service firm stakeholders are obliged to place greater reliance on 
the financial statements and hence consistency and transparency are important. 
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Financial institutions can signal that there might be problems ahead by, for example, 
changes in provisions or in dividend policies.  The CPBS signalled the end of a period 
of high growth and the start of one of consolidation, but did not articulate fully the 
implications of this change. 
A broader inference from this article is that during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
directors of building societies, and perhaps even banks, had limited regard for 
financial considerations when making expansion and capital expenditure decisions. 
But accounting for fixed assets was to become much more important to the history of 
financial service organizations because ‘tax policy and depreciation profoundly 
influenced the timing of when companies acquired large computers, which were 
capital-intensive investments’ (Cortada, 2004, p. 23).  This suggests that future studies 
on capital-intensive investments in U.K. retail finance (such as computerization and 
retail branch network expansion in the 1960s and 1970s) will need to explore the 
interaction between strategic and financial considerations in the selection and timing 
of those investments. 
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TABLE 1 
GROSS AND NET RESERVES, 1950-67, SELECTED YEARS 
Year 
 Abbey 
National Alliance 
Co-operative 
Permanent Halifax 
Leeds 
Permanent 
Woolwich 
Equitable  
Unweighted
average 
  
  Panel A - Gross Reserves = Total reserves / total assets %  
        
1950 5.4 2.2 4.6 5.8 6.7 5.4 5.0 
1955 3.9 2.1 3.2 4.5 5.3 4.2 3.9 
1958 3.6 2.7 2.7 3.5 5.1 4.3 3.6 
1959 3.7 3.1 2.9 3.6 5.2 4.3 3.8 
1960 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.5 5.4 4.0 3.9 
        
 Average 
1959-67 
3.5 3.3 3.3 3.6 5.0 3.8 3.8 
        
 Panel B - Net reserves / net total assets % 
        
1959 3.6 2.5 2.3 3.6 5.2 3.2 3.4 
1960 3.2 2.9 2.7 3.5 5.2 2.9 3.4 
Average 
 1959-67 3.4 3.0 3.1 3.6 4.7 3.4 3.5 
  
 Panel C - Other information 
        
Established 1944 1863 1884 1853 1848 1847 1857 
Incorporated 1944 1879 1884 1875 1875 1875 1878 
Achieved  
national  
branch  
coverage 
1948 1959 1952 1937 1961 1948 1951 
 
Source: Building Societies Yearbook, 1950 to 1968 and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Financial year-ends: Leeds Permanent and Woolwich Equitable: 30 September; 
Abbey National, Alliance, Co-operative Permanent: 31 December; and Halifax: 31 
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January. Abridged balance sheets were reported in the Building Societies Yearbook 
published in the following June, that is, the same year in which the Halifax closed its 
books.  The Abbey National was created in 1944 through the union of two large and 
long standing societies, the Abbey Road (established 1874) and the National 
(established 1849). 
 
TABLE 2 
ASSET GROWTH AT THE MAJOR BUILDING SOCIETIES, 1950-67 
Year 
 Abbey 
National Alliance 
Co-operative 
Permanent Halifax 
Leeds 
Permanent 
Woolwich 
Equitable  
Unweighted
average 
  
  Panel A - Mortgage asset growth per year (%)  
        
 Average 12.7 14.5 12.5 14.2 12.2 11.4 12.9 
        
 Panel B - Cumulative mortgage asset growth, various periods (%)  
        
1950-1967 568 730 585 534 448 442 551 
1950-1958 108 128 166 91 92 87 112 
1958-1967 221 263 158 231 185 190 208 
1960-1965 53 69 37 55 50 52 53 
 
Source: as Table 1. 
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TABLE 3 
EFFECTIVE DEPRECIATION RATES (%), 1951-60 
Year Abbey 
National 
Alliance Co-operative 
Permanent 
Halifax Leeds 
Permanent 
Woolwich 
Equitable 
Leek and 
Moorlands 
Minimum Maximum Unweighted 
average 
1951 2.18 2.75 2.84 10.19 0 2.49 0.98 0 10.19 3.06 
1952 2.11 3.23 3.83 9.99 0 2.66 1.91 0 9.99 3.39 
1953 2.19 3.22 3.15 9.13 0 4.42 2.45 0 9.13 3.51 
1954 2.42 2.51 2.75 7.72 0 3.18 2.18 0 7.72 2.97 
1955 2.85 2.13 3.31 6.89 0 2.38 2.29 0 6.89 2.84 
1956 2.81 2.16 3.32 6.40 0 2.57 2.88 0 6.40 2.88 
1957 2.55 1.36 3.20 5.42 0 1.89 3.03 0 5.42 2.49 
1958 3.31 1.20 3.19 n/a 7.87 2.99 2.47 1.20 7.87 3.50 
1959 2.98 1.24 4.11 9.23 6.09 2.39 3.48 1.24 9.23 4.22 
1960 3.06 0.97 2.24 3.97 4.88 2.80 3.18 0.97 4.88 3.01 
Average 2.64 2.08 3.19 7.66 1.88 2.78 2.49 1.88 7.66 3.25 
 
Source: authors’ calculations from TNA, Forms A.R. 11. 
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Note: The effective depreciation rate is expressed as a percentage, and calculated as the total charge for depreciation shown in the Revenue and 
Appropriation Account divided by the total year-end net book value for fixed assets shown in the Balance Sheet.  Year-end dates are as shown in 
Table 1.  n/a = Form A.R. 11 missing for this year. 
42 
 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1
 Griffiths (1986), Jameson (1988) and Smith (1992) have examined a later strand of 
creative accounting practices in the UK. 
2
  BSA Council Report, 1959-60, paragraph 1, p. 5. 
3
  The Times, 6 November 1958, p. 16. 
4
 Building Societies Yearbook 1960, Editorial, ‘Housing and House Purchase Act 
1959’, p. 36. 
5
 The HHPA59 gave trustee status only to deposits in the societies but the Trustee 
Investments Act 1961 then included ‘share’ investments. 
6
 ‘Building Society Deposits Given Trustee Status’, The Times, 6 November 1958, p. 
16; ‘Trustee Status for 130 Societies’, The Times, 19 June 1959, p. 19. 
7
 BSA Circular 664, paragraph 26. For a detailed discussion see Perks  (1977, pp. 79-
82). 
8
 BSA Circular 664, paragraph 26. 
9
 The State had made mortgage advances, without proper security, for bridging 
finance in takeover bids made by a company of which the State’s directors were also 
directors.  Other changes in the BSA60 reinforced requirements for the valuation of 
collateral for mortgage loans, prevented directors from valuing property for mortgage 
loans and introduced the disclosure by directors of interests in potential conflict with 
the running of their society’s business.  Section 40(2) gave the CRFS, with the 
consent of the Treasury, the power to determine, by statutory instrument (S.I. 1960 
No. 1826), the particulars to be included in the balance sheet and revenue and 
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appropriation account of individual societies. Section 50(3) made similar provisions 
regarding the contents of the Annual Return (S.I. 1960 No. 1827). 
10
 S.I. 1960 No. 1827, part 6(e).  
11
 BSA Circular 671, paragraph 5. 
12
 Between 1925 and 1935, CPBS’s retail branches grew to 19, with the first Scottish 
branch in 1930. Between 1936 and 1945 the number of retail branches grew to 46, 
surpassing the rate of growth in agencies. Between 1946 and 1955 agency numbers 
grew faster (from 577 to 2,016 agencies) than branches, which grew to 93 (Cassell, 
1984, p. 121). Agency numbers peaked at 3,165 in 1958, but many of these were not 
effective sources of mortgage referrals (Bátiz-Lazo, 2004).  
13
 The mortgage rate cartel was a system of forced customer loyalty built around the 
BSA (Bátiz-Lazo, 2004). 
14
 BSA Circular 664, page 4, table II. 
15
 ‘Drop in Building Society’s Reserves’, The Times, 2 May 1958, p. 17; ‘Building 
Society Merger Terms’, The Times, 24 April 1958, p. 5.  
16
 ‘An Exceptionally Active Year’, The Times, 9 March 1959, p. 58. The SABS 
directors retired without compensation but, with the transfer of the CPBS’s business 
in Scotland, became the CPBS’s Scottish board. 
17
 WEBSA, 1023/49, Board Minutes, ‘Co-operative Permanent Building Society’, 18 
March 1958. 
18
 WEBSA, 1023/1249, Development Committee papers, ‘ “Notes on Statistics 
relating to Financial Structures” of Halifax, Co-operative Permanent and Woolwich’, 
19 August 1958.  In 1939 the CPBS amalgamated with the Wellingborough 
Investment Building Society and its 5 offices and with 15 small societies from 1942-7 
(Cassell, 1984, p. 48). 
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19
 ‘Co-operative Offer “Unwarranted” ’, The Times, 6 January 1959, p. 4. 
20
 ‘Building Society Dispute’, The Times, 9 January 1959, p. 5.  
21
 ‘Building Societies’ Take-Over Dispute’, The Times, 3 January 1959, p. 6. 
22
 ‘Another Bid for Building Society’, The Times, 7 January 1959, p. 10; ‘Building 
Society Taken Over’, The Times, 10 January 1959, p. 6. 
23
 ‘New Chairman for the Building Societies Association’, The Times, 15 July 1961, 
p. 13. 
24
 The Economist noted the anticipated importance of trustee investment status among 
building society depositors, and its possible influence on building societies’ interest 
rate decisions (‘Abbey National’s Expansion’, Economist, 10 January 1959, pp. 156-
9; ‘Godot in the Building Societies’, Economist, 18 April 1959, pp. 254-5). 
25
 WEBSA, 1023/1249, Development Committee, 3 March 1959 meeting, Item 6. 
26
 ‘Affairs of the State B. Society’, The Times, 12 June 1961, p. 21; RFS, 1961, p. 1. 
27
 ‘Controlled Expansion’, Building Societies’ Gazette, Vol. 80, March 1959, p. 177.  
Italics added for emphasis. 
28
 ‘The Co-operative Consolidates’, Economist, 31 January 1959, pp. 437-8. 
29
 ‘Co-operative B.S. to Consolidate’, The Times, 29 January 1959, p. 5. 
30
 The move to replace agents was not unique to the CPBS.  From 1948 there was 
growing realization amongst directors of building societies that retail branches 
‘promised control, co-ordination and continuity in a way that commission agents, 
however special, could not’ (Harvey, 1988, p.  257). As a result, national retail branch 
networks mushroomed during the 1960s and 1970s (Davies, 1981; Bátiz-Lazo and 
Billings, 2007). 
31
 CPBS, Confidential Minute Book, 27 October 1960. 
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32
 Cassell’s corporate history of the Nationwide cites a value of £550,000 for the sale 
and leaseback contract and makes no reference to the retail branches or the 
depreciation issue (1984, p. 80). Property sale and leaseback transactions, particularly 
by retailers with insurance companies as the typical counterparty, had become 
common in the 1930s.  Such transactions were preferable to overdraft or mortgage 
finance as a higher percentage of a property’s market value could be realized.  They 
were widely used again in the 1950s as part of Britain’s postwar takeover boom, 
allowing companies to raise finance when the Capital Issues Committee still 
controlled capital-raising (Scott, 1996, pp. 52-3, 122). 
33
 CPBS, Board Minutes , 19 January 1961, 4.I.a. 
34
 The CRFS relaxed the reserve ratio requirement in 1964, requiring reserves of 2.5 
per cent for the first £100 million of assets, but reserves of only 2 per cent for assets 
above this.  In 1967 a committee chaired by Sir Charles Hardie recommended lower 
reserve ratios for larger societies, a suggestion which would have saved the CPBS 
much trouble had it been implemented earlier (Cassell, 1984, p. 81). New reserve 
requirements took effect in 1968 and remained unchanged until the mid-1980s 
(Boléat, 1986, pp. 57-8). 
35
 CPBS, Board Minutes , 19 January 1961, 4.I.a and 5.I. 
36
 S.I. 1960 No. 1827, part 5 (a and b). 
37
 It is not clear that there were any audit qualifications of building societies.  After 
discovery of fraud at the Grays Building Society, ‘An extended search of public 
sources resulted in no record of a major threat for building societies’ accounts being 
qualified before October 1978’ (‘Stricter Checks Pose Audit Problems for Small 
Building Societies’, The Times, 12 October 1978, p. 27). 
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38
 ‘Stricter Checks Pose Audit Problems for Small Building Societies’, The Times, 12 
October 1978, p. 27. 
39
 The Annual Returns (Forms A.R. 11) show that J.A. McGilchrist CA became junior 
auditor in 1956 and J. Heaford FCA senior auditor in 1957 (TNA, FS 14/559) after J. 
B. Prentice FCA ‘… was compelled to resign the office of members’ auditor which he 
had held for the past 17 years because of ill health’ (‘Good Progress in Spite of 
Unfavourable Conditions’, The Times, 3 March 1958, p. 17).  The partnership of 
Edward Myers, Clark & Co. dissolved in the early 1970s while the practice based at 
56/61 Moorgate (the last known address for  Heaford and  McGilchrist) was 
amalgamated with ‘one of the top twenty firms’ (information supplied by Richard 
Driver, 2 February 2006).  
40
 In the 1960s large auditing firms undertook consultancy work in the 
computerization of several societies including the CPBS, LMBS and WEBS (Bátiz-
Lazo and Wardley, 2007).   
